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Ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, by Text

[Austrian, 1889 - 1951, Born Vienna. Aeronautics at Manchester, then philosophy with Russell in Cambridge. Austrian army in WWI. Teacher in the Alps, then back to Cambridge. Died in Cambridge.]

1913 Notes on Logic
B7 p.322 22312 Facts can be both positive and negative [Potter]
1915 Notebooks 1914-1916
§37 p.28 6563 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Fogelin]
14.09.29 p.7 23481 Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident
15.06.01 p.53 23500 My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori
1916. 2 Sep p.379 22323 The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world
23e p.23 18276 A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents
4 p.973 16908 We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion]
46e p.46 18274 Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning
end p.171 4678 Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example
p.14c p.14 23472 The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure
1919 Letters to Russell
p.18 7085 The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Grayling]
CL 125 p.32 23463 Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions
p.125 p.157 23490 A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do
1921 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
p.6 7537 Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Monk]
p.8 17665 The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Armstrong]
p.12 6849 Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Monk]
p.14 10967 Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read]
p.16 9810 The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou]
p.18 7084 What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Grayling]
p.35 18349 All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Rami]
p.36 7087 Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Grayling]
p.38 7088 Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Grayling]
p.39 4702 The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [O'Grady]
p.66 23507 Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [White,RM]
p.71 7090 The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Grayling]
p.74 10910 The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
p.88 6428 Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Russell]
p.113 23479 The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Morris,M]
p.143 9467 Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Jacquette]
p.194 13429 The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Ramsey]
p.228 13830 Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Hacking]
p.286 18154 The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Bostock]
Pref p.3 23499 This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up
Pref p.4 23459 This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value
1 - 1.2 p.5 13133 The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts
1.11 p.322 22311 The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts
1.12 p.27 23462 He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Morris,M]
2.0123 p.6 11027 To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences
2.01231 p.349 22321 To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Potter]
2.013 p.6 23470 Each thing is in a space of possible facts
2.0141 p.6 23465 The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts
2.02 p.7 23467 Objects are simple
2.0201 p.7 6429 All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions
2.021 p.7 23466 Objects are the substance of the world
2.022 p.7 23469 An imagined world must have something in common with the real world
2.0233 p.7 12869 Two objects may only differ in being different
2.024 p.7 23468 Apart from the facts, there is only substance
2.03 p.8 23464 In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links
2.032-3 p.8 23471 The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form
2.04 p.53 23473 Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M]
2.06 p.322 22313 The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact
2.151 p.9 23482 The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations
2.1511-5 p.9 7056 Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts
2.15121 p.129 23483 Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Morris,M]
2.202 p.10 23486 Pictures are possible situations in logical space
2.225 p.10 23485 No pictures are true a priori
3.02 p.11 23487 What is thinkable is possible
3.203/3.26 p.12 7089 A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object
3.26 p.13 23506 Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed
3.328 p.16 2939 If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim
4.002 p.19 23492 Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque
4.003 p.19 23510 Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language
4.0031 p.109 18268 Apparent logical form may not be real logical form
4.024 p.21 23488 Propositions are understood via their constituents
4.024 p.21 8172 To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true
4.025 p.21 23489 We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions
4.03 p.22 23511 Propositions use old expressions for a new sense
4.0312 p.22 10905 My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent
4.063 p.55 22314 On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact
4.11 p.25 23508 Science is all the true propositions
4.123 p.27 7968 A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it
4.1252 p.27 7969 The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one
4.1272 p.29 7784 'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x
4.211 p.89 21682 If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it
4.221 p.337 22319 Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names
5.132 p.39 18277 If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference
5.134 p.109 21683 Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition
5.1363 p.972 16907 If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth
5.44 p.45 23493 'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p
5.4731 p.47 11062 Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically
5.4731 p.973 16909 Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically
5.5301 p.52 6056 Identity is not a relation between objects
5.5302 p.358 22322 You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable
5.5303 p.52 6057 Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept
5.5421 p.54 23498 The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible
5.5422 p.54 23475 The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable
5.6 p.56 2938 The limits of my language means the limits of my world
5.61 p.56 23502 Logic fills the world, to its limits
5.62 p.57 23497 Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language
5.632 p.57 2940 The subject stands outside our understanding of the world
5.634 p.58 23501 There is no a priori order of things
5.64 p.58 23503 Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality
6.021 p.59 18153 A number is a repeated operation
6.022 p.59 18160 The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common
6.031 p.59 18161 The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics
6.1 p.59 18162 The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies
6.12 p.60 23495 The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world
6.1262 p.64 15089 Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies
6.127 p.64 19292 Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status
6.22 p.65 23509 The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics
6.3 p.67 23504 Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident
6.363 p.70 2941 Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences
6.37 p.70 9442 The only necessity is logical necessity
6.371 p.70 17673 The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature
6.3751 p.71 23496 Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour
6.41 p.71 2942 The sense of the world must lie outside the world
6.421 p.71 2943 Ethics cannot be put into words
6.5 p.73 2944 If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it
6.51 p.73 6591 Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable
6.53 p.73 7086 Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics
6.54 p.74 23512 Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical
7 p.74 2937 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence
7 p.267 6870 I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson]
1930 Philosophical Remarks
p.200 p.257 18282 You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it
p.72 p.348 22320 An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence
p.85 p.326 18283 Language pictures the essence of the world
1931 Lectures 1930-32 (student notes)
A I.1 p.1 18704 Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life
A I.4 p.2 18705 Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine
A I.4 p.3 18706 Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense
A V.1 p.10 18707 All thought has the logical form of reality
A VII.2 p.13 18708 Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law
A XI.3 p.19 18709 Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game
B Easter p.62 18727 A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied
B I.1 p.22 18710 Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle
B I.2 p.22 18711 A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated
B I.5 p.24 18712 Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols
B II.4 p.27 18713 If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future
B IX.6 p.47 18719 Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense
B V.1 p.35 18714 We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts
B VI.2 p.37 18715 Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green'
B VII.2 p.40 18716 A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement
B VIII p.42 18717 Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it
B VIII.2 p.43 18718 Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence
B X.3 p.48 18720 Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing
B XI.2 p.51 18721 Explanation and understanding are the same
B XII.1 p.53 18723 We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit
B XII.3 p.54 18724 In logic nothing is hidden
B XIII.2 p.56 18725 A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it
B XIV.2 p.57 18726 For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language
C I p.66 18728 The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification
C III p.69 18729 Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them
C V A p.74 18730 The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories
C V B p.75 18731 There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept
C V B p.76 18732 We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well
C V C p.79 18733 Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description
C VII p.83 18734 If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering
C X p.87 18735 Talking nonsense is not following the rules
C XIII p.92 18736 Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality
C XIII p.93 18737 There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions
Notes p.114 18738 We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2)
p.82 p.245 18280 We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects
1932 Philosophical Grammar
§127 p.152 6606 Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful"
p.468 p.255 18281 In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning
1935 talk
p.14 7536 If you hope to improve the world, all you can do is improve yourself
1935 works
p.40 10710 We accept substance, to avoid infinite backwards chains of meaning [Potter]
1936 The Blue and Brown Notebooks
II.§16 n p.77 6318 The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Quine]
pp. 66-7 p.48 22419 'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [McGinn]
1938 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics
p.38 p.155 11073 Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference
p.38 p.155 11074 'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows
1945 Culture and Value
53e p.53 16010 While faith is a passion (as Kierkegaard says), wisdom is passionless
1950 Zettel
§691 p.51 6569 'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Fogelin]
455 p.1 2626 A philosopher is outside any community of ideas
i.437 p.27 3790 Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents
1951 On Certainty
p.159 3596 Total doubt can't even get started [Williams,M]
§114 p.94 4721 If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either
§152 p.165 3597 Foundations need not precede other beliefs
1952 Philosophical Investigations
p.12 23450 Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Morris,M]
p.14 12576 Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Peacocke]
p.17 18743 Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Horsten/Pettigrew]
p.43 6567 For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Fogelin]
p.91 6501 As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Robinson,H]
p.209 7055 Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Heil]
§019 p.8 4136 To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life
§043 p.20 4137 In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language
§047 p.22 4138 Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow?
§049 p.24 4139 Naming is a preparation for description
§050 p.25 4140 The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long
§067 p.32 4141 Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross
§079 p.31 4946 A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Kripke]
§109 p.-24 2512 Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language
§125 p.40 6566 The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life
§198 p.81 4142 To understand a sentence means to understand a language
§201 p.81 6165 Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict
§202 p.81 4143 One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying
§202 p.93 6166 Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands]
§202 p.95 6169 We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Rowlands]
§206 p.82 4144 Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language
§242 p.88 11049 To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition
§244 p.89 4145 How do words refer to sensations?
§246 p.89 5676 To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain
§257 p.92 7875 If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it
§265 p.94 4146 We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper)
§293 p.100 4147 If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box
§293 p.100 5663 It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's
§293 p.282 5659 If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Scruton]
§302 p.101 19272 To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel
§309 p.103 4148 What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle
§329 p.107 4149 We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions
§353 p.112 4150 Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition
§371-3 p.116 15106 Essence is expressed by grammar
§373 p.116 4151 Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar
§380 p.117 4152 Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use
§401 p.121 4153 Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made?
§412 p.124 4154 Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life?
§435 p.128 4155 We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them
§473 p.134 6600 The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns
§510 p.140 4156 Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here"
§570 p.151 4157 Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests
§580 p.125 7092 If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling]
§580 p.153 4158 An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria
§621 p.161 6658 What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm?
116 p.108 22490 Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use
213 p.84 11079 How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition?
II.13 p.231 12606 Man learns the concept of the past by remembering
II.iv p.178 19273 I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such
II.iv p.178 4159 The human body is the best picture of the human soul
II.x p.190 4160 One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs
II.xi p.223 4161 If a lion could talk, we could not understand him
II.xi p.447 7392 If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett]